We analyze theoretically and empirically the implications of information asymmetry for equilibrium asset pricing and portfolio choice. In our partially revealing dynamic rational expectations equilibrium, portfolio separation fails and indexing is not optimal. We show how uninformed investors should structure their portfolios, using the information contained in prices, to cope with winner's curse problems. We implement empirically this price-contingent portfolio strategy. Consistent with our theory, the strategy outperforms economically and statistically the index. While momentum can arise in the model, in the data the momentum strategy does not outperform the price-contingent strategy, as predicted by the theory.
Introduction
The theory of financial markets under homogeneous information has generated a rich body of predictions, extensively used in the financial industry, such as the optimality of indexing, the restrictions imposed by absence of arbitrage, and equilibrium-based pricing relations, such as the CAPM and multi-factor extensions. In contrast, the theory of capital markets under asymmetric information has not been used much to guide asset pricing and portfolio allocation decisions. The goal of the present paper is to derive some of the implications of partially revealing rational expectations equilibria for asset pricing and asset allocation, and to test their empirical relevance.
We consider an overlapping generations model, extending the multi-asset rational expectations equilibrium of Admati (1985) to the dynamic case. Agents live for one period and trade in the market for N risky securities, generating cash flows at each period. Some investors have private information about the future cash flows, while others are uninformed. Revelation is only partial because the demand of informed investors reflects their random endowment shocks, along with their signals. Equilibrium prices are identical to those which would obtain in a representative agent economy where i) the market portfolio would be equal to the supply of securities augmented by the aggregate risky endowment shock and ii) the beliefs of the representative agent would be a weighted average of the informed and uninformed agents' beliefs. This pricing relation cannot be directly relied upon in the econometrics since the beliefs of the representative agent are not observable by the econometrician. Hence, to test our model, we instead focus on portfolio choice.
We show that portfolio separation does not obtain, as investors hold different portfolios, reflecting their different information sets. Uninformed agents invest more than the aggregate portfolio in assets about which they are more optimistic than the informed agent. To cope with this winner's curse problem, they optimally extract information from prices. Thus they hold portfolios which are mean-variance efficient conditional upon the information revealed by prices. This enables uninformed agents without endowment shocks to outperform the index. Indeed, the agents with endowment shocks are willing to pay a premium to hedge their risk. Outperformance reflects the reward to providing insurance to these agents.
The information set of the econometrician is comparable to that of uninformed agents with no endowment shocks. To confront our model to the data, we empirically construct the optimal price-contingent portfolio of the uninformed agents. We test the key implication from our theory that this portfolio outperforms the index. We use monthly U.S. stock data over the period . We extract the information contained in prices by projecting returns onto (relative) prices. We use the corresponding expected returns and variance-covariance matrix to construct the conditional mean-variance optimal portfolio of the uninformed agent. We then compare the performance of this portfolio, as measured by its Sharpe ratio, to that of the value-weighted CRSP index. We find that the optimal price-contingent portfolio outperforms the index, both economically and statistically.
The optimal price-contingent portfolio allocation strategy we analyze is entirely based on ex-ante information. Portfolio decisions made at the beginning of month t rely on price and return data prior to month t. Thus, we only use information available to market participants when they chose their portfolios. Hence, our result that the optimal price-contingent allocation strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold indexing strategy differs from the Fama and French (1996) findings. Fama and French show that, based on return means, variances and covariances estimated as empirical moments over a period including month t as well as later months, an optimal combination of their "factor portfolios" outperforms the index. However, Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2004) show that, if one estimates these empirical moments using only information prior to month t, the factor portfolios fail to outperform the buy-and-hold strategy.
To construct our price-contingent investment portfolio we use relative prices. The latter are correlated with past returns, on which momentum strategies rely. 1 We show that momentum can arise in our theoretical framework. The performance of momentum strategies would lead to a rejection of this theory only if it exceeded the performance our price-contingent strategy. Empirically, we find that the momentum strategy does not outperform the price-contingent strategy. In addition the correlation structure on which our price-contingent strategy is based is more complex than the positive serial correlation corresponding to momentum. The correlations we empirically estimate and use in our price-contingent strategies have variable signs. This is consistent with our theoretical framework. For example, in the multi-asset rational expectations equilibrium analyzed by Admati (1985) , the correlation between prices and subsequent returns can be positive, negative or insignificant.
Our theoretical analysis is directly in the line of the one-period multi-asset model of Admati (1985) and its dynamic extension by Brennan and Cao (1997) . Brennan and Cao (1997) consider long-lived agents in a finite horizon model. Relying on normality and linearity, they are able to obtain a nice simplification and show that the optimal demand of each agent at each point in time is the same as if there were no further trading opportunities. Thus, given past information, the equilibrium at each point in time is the same as in the one-period case analyzed by Admati (1985) . In contrast, we consider an infinite horizon model. In this context, the equilibrium at each point in time differs from the equilibrium of the one-period model. Expectations about future prices influence the decisions of the traders and hence the current price. 2 Thus there are two rational expectations loops in the present model: On the one hand, agents have rational expectations about the link between the current signals and the current price, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Admati (1985) and Brennan and Cao (1997) . On the other hand, there is also a link between the current price and the next period's price function, as in the seminal analysis of Lucas (1978) . 3 These two rational expectations loops are also at play in the insightful analysis of dynamic asset pricing under asymmetric information by Wang (1993) . The main differences between our analysis and his are the following: (i) We analyze the multi-asset case, while he focuses on a single risky asset. (ii) We consider an overlapping generations discrete-time model, while he studies infinitely-lived agents in a continuous-time model. (iii) Our model is designed to set the stage for our econometric analysis, while his analysis is purely theoretical.
Several interesting papers have analyzed empirical applications of the noisy rational expectations framework. Cho and Krishnan (2000) evaluate the importance of prices in aggregating private information in the S&P 500 futures market by estimating the primitive parameters of the Hellwig (1980) single risky asset model. Brennan and Cao (1997) study the implications of dynamic noisy rational expectations equilibrium for international investment flows. Grundy and Kim (2002) study the implications for volatility of partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium. Kalay and Wohl (2001) apply this type of equilibrium to the study of market microstructure. Our analysis differs from these because we focus on the empirical implications of the theory for asset pricing and portfolio choice.
The next section presents our theoretical model. Our econometric approach is discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Multi-Asset Rational Expectations Equilibrium 2.1 Assumptions
The sequence of events
We consider an overlapping generations model where agents live for one period and have CARA utilities with risk aversion parameter γ. There are N risky assets, each generating a stream of cash flows at time t = 0, 1, .., ∞. The vector of asset payoffs at time t is denoted f t . Generation t enters the market at the beginning of period t. There is a mass one continuum of agents a ∈ [0, 1]. They receive cash C and random endowments, and observe signal y t a , about next period's cash flows. Random endowments received at time t are state contingent endowments of consumption good to be received at t + 1. We denote them by e t a . After privately observing their endowments and signals, agents trade q t a at price p t . Market clearing requires that the new generation buy the entire supply of tradeable assets (denoted x) from the previous generation. At the beginning of the next period, dividends (f t+1 ) are realized and distributed and state contingent endowments of the consumption good are received. Cash flows and aggregate endowments are publicly observed. At the end of the period, generation t sells its holdings at price p t+1 . Before leaving the market, they consume their wealth, denoted W t a . Projecting e t a onto f t+1 + p t+1 :
The regression coefficient, z t a , measures the sensitivity of the endowment shocks to the risky assets' returns. η t+1 a corresponds to the component of the shock that is not spanned by the risky assets. When receiving her endowment at time t, agent a does not know what the future prices and cash flows or the noise term (η t+1 a ) will be. On the other hand, she knows the structure of her random endowment, i.e., she knows z t a . As will be apparent below, because we assume it is uncorrelated with the other random variables in the model η t+1 a does not affect the decisions of the agents. In contrast, z t a does. Hence, we will hereafter (somewhat loosely) refer to z t a as the endowment shocks. The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1 .
Informed and uninformed agents
For simplicity, we assume there are only two types of agents. A fraction λ of the agents has endowment shocks and observes an informational signal. To simplify the analysis we assume they all observe the same signal: y t = f t+1 + t . The complementary fraction has no endowment shock. This implies in particular that z t a = 0. Also, these agents do not observe any signal. Of course, we do not claim that these specific assumptions about the association between signals and shocks are realistic. It's just the simplest possible structure in which we can develop our dynamic rational expectations model. Similar qualitative results would obtain in a less stylized model, e.g., under the assumption that some agents without an endowment shock have an informational signal. One advantage of the theoretical framework we develop here is that it is in line with the empirical approach taken in the following sections. In particular, the uninformed agents in the theoretical model solve exactly the same problem as the econometrician in the empirical analysis in the next section.
Denote by z t the aggregate endowment shock: λ a∈S z t a da = z t , where S is the set of informed agents. We assume z t follows an autoregressive process:
where z is white noise and ρ z is a coefficient matrix with eigenvalues strictly less than one, so that z is stationary. Similarly, the cash flows generated by the risky assets at each period follows an autoregressive process:
, where f is white noise and ρ f is such that f is stationary. The private signals are equal to the realization of the cash flow plus a noise term:
All the random variables are assumed to be jointly normal.
Analysis

Prices and demand
We look for a stationary linear rational expectations price function:
Imposing this stationary form, where the coefficients are time independent, rules out bubbles (which are non stationary). The price function in equation (1) is similar to the equilibrium price function in equation (3) in Admati (1985) . The main difference is that in Admati (1985) the equilibrium price is a function of only two variables, the final cash flow and the current supply shock, while in the present model it is also a function of the prior cash flow and the prior shock. 4 In our dynamic analysis, it is necessary to include these two additional variables to summarize the past of the process. Note however that, in the simple environment we consider, it is enough to include only the prior cash flow and the prior shock. Previous realizations of the variables don't enter the equilibrium price function. This differs from Brennan and Cao (1997) and Wang (1993) where the entire past history entered the price function. The final wealth of agent a is:
where r is the exogenous risk-free rate. Because of linearity, conditionally on the price, all the random variables are jointly normal. Thus, the program of agent a at time t is:
where I t a is the information set of agent a at time t. That is:
All expectations and variances are taken conditionally upon the public information set at the beginning of period t, including in particular: f t and z t−1 . For brevity, we hereafter neglect to write these variables explicitly in the conditioning set. The optimal demand of the informed agents is:
V ar[f t+1 + p t+1 |y t ] is constant over time because of linearity and stationarity of the pricing function and joint normality of the variables. The inverse of this matrix is τ y , the precision of the information to the informed agents. The demand of the informed agents is written as:
This demand reflects the endowment shock z t a , as agents seek to trade away from their undiversified endowments, to hold more balanced porfolios. For example, consider an agent working for General Electric, whose income and wealth are exposed to the risk of this firm. This agent will optimally choose to hold relatively less of this stock than of other stocks.
The demand of the uninformed agent is:
where τ p denotes the precision of the information set of the uninformed agents. Importantly, this information set includes the current price. The uninformed agents rationally anticipate that prices partially reflect the signal of the informed agents. They use this information to determine their demand.
Equilibrium
Market clearing implies:
This yields the market-clearing price:
where:
Defining the average expectation as:
and the average variance-covariance matrix as:
one obtains the pricing relation stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If there exists a stationary linear rational expectations equilibrium, prices satisfy the following restriction:
Equation (2) essentially tells us that the portfolio of aggregate risk, x + z, is mean-variance optimal for the average expectations vector: E m [f t+1 + p t+1 ] and variance-covariance matrix: Ω m . Otherwise stated, equilibrium prices are identical to those which would obtain in a homogeneous information-representative agent economy, where the market portfolio would be equal to the supply of securities (x) augmented by the aggregate risky endowment (z) and the representative agent would have average beliefs. A CAPM return-covariance relationship holds, from the perspective of the representative agent, relative to this augmented portfolio (x + z),which differs from the index (x). After standard manipulations, equation (2) yields the classic CAPM equilibrium return equation, for our representative agent economy:
where
− p t i is the return on asset i, expectations are taken from the point of view of the representative investor's average belief, and β t i is defined as:
.
Note that, since z t follows a stochastic process, betas are stochastically evolving too. This pricing relation cannot be directly relied upon in the econometrics to estimate a representative agent model, however. Indeed, the beliefs of the representative agent are not observable by the econometrician. Nor is the portfolio of aggregate risk (x + z) observable, a point that is related to the Roll (1977) critique. 5 Thus we take another route to confront our model to the data, as explained in the next section.
The aggregation result we obtain in our dynamic rational expectation equilibrium context is related to previous results obtained in static models. First, the pricing equation (2) differs from that stated in Corollary 3.5 in Admati (1985) . Admati's characterizes the ex-ante expected price, computed by averaging across all realizations of the random variables, while the pricing function described here holds for each realization of the random variables. Correspondingly, Admati (1985) shows that an aggregate CAPM obtains on average across possible realizations of the random variables. This contrasts with the equilibrium relationships described in the present paper, which hold in every possible state of the world. Second, our aggregation result with heterogeneous beliefs reflects in part our assumption that agents have exponential utility. This is in line with the Gorman aggregation results obtained by Wilson (1968) (see also Huang and Litzenberger, 1988, p. 146-148) and Lintner (1969) . In these analyses, however, beliefs are exogenous. In ours aggregation obtains with endogenous beliefs. Third, DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) also offer a theoretical analysis of a CAPM with heterogeneous information, but our model differs from theirs. On the one hand they allow for a more general class of utility functions than we do. On the other hand, a key ingredient in our model is that the aggregate portfolio of risks is unknown by the uninformed agents, which prevents prices from being fully informative. In contrast, the CAPM result obtained by DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) reflects their assumption that the aggregate supply of each of the risky assets is common knowledge for all the agents. 6 Finally, O'Hara (2003) also focuses on the impact of asymmetric information on portfolio choice and asset pricing in the Grossman and Stiglitz framework. We extend Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) to an overlapping generations context, derive a variant of the CAPM in our setting and bring to the data a central empirical implication of the model.
Simple manipulations of the market-clearing condition yield the following result:
Proposition 2: If there exists a stationary linear rational expectations equilibrium, the demand of the uninformed agent is:
Proof of Proposition 2:
The market clearing condition yields:
that is:
Since:
multiplying both sides of the equality by: (λτ y + (1 − λ)τ p ), it simplifies to:
Thus:
6 Proposition 6 in DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) establishes that a CAPM holds in equilibrium. It is obtained in the context of their definition of a Linear Risk Tolerance Economy. The definition of a Linear Risk Tolerance Economy (Definition 4, pages 138 and 139) states that the endowment of agent i is ei = ai + biV , where V is the value of the asset and ai and bi are coefficients such that: a = P i ai and b = P i bi are common knowledge to all the agents. Hence, in this economy, the aggregate endowment of the risky assets is common knowledge.
Noting that the left-hand-side of this inequality is equal to the demand of the uninformed agent, we obtain the proposition. QED
The demand of the uninformed agent is equal to the portfolio of aggregate risk, x + z t , which she would hold if information was homogeneous, minus a correction term. The latter underscores the winner's curse problem faced by the uninformed agent. She invests more than the aggregate portfolio in asset i when she is more optimistic about this asset than the informed agent, while she invests less otherwise. Hence, portfolio separation does not obtain in our asymmetric information environment. Different agents hold different portfolios, to the extent that they have different information sets. 7 In contrast with the homogeneous information case, the uninformed agent does not buy the portfolio of aggregate risk (x + z). She does not do so intentionally, because she does not know this portfolio. However, she invests optimally given the information she observes, which includes in particular the current prices.
The portfolio she holds outperforms the index. One might wonder how uninformed agents can obtain such superior performance. It arises because the agents with endowment shocks are willing to pay a premium to hedge their risk. Thus, the performance obtained by the uninformed agents reflects the price other agents are willing to pay for insurance.
Since the uninformed agent does not know the structure of the portfolio of aggregate risk, her deviation from this portfolio can be interpreted as estimation risk. In the past (e.g., Kandel and Stambaugh [1996] ), estimation risk has been studied under homogeneous information, in which case it only adds to variance. In our asymetric information setting, estimation risk also yields a winner's curse. Consequently, our analysis introduces a new dimension to the nature of estimation risk.
Proposition 3: There exists a linear stationary rational expectations equilibrium,
if there exists a solution (A, B, C, D, G) to the following system of non-linear equations.
The system of nonlinear equations stated in Proposition 3 is rather complicated. This contrasts with the elegant closed-form solutions obtained by Admati (1985) . The additional complexity we face here stems from the dynamic nature of the problem. The price at time t reflects the expectations of the agents about the cash flow and the price at time t + 1. Thus, the rational expectations loop is more complicated than in the one-period case. In the latter, agents must have rational expectations about the link between the current price and the current signals. In the dynamic case, there is also a link between the current price and the next period's price function. A similar complexity arises in the dynamic analysis of asset pricing under asymmetric information by Wang (1993) . 8
Special cases
In special cases, the existence and properties of equilibrium can be analyzed explicitly. First consider the simplest case, without endowment shocks and without private signals. In this case, market clearing yields:
Thus a standard dynamic-CAPM obtains. All agents have the same beliefs and they all hold the market portfolio, i.e., indexing is optimal. Manipulating the system in Proposition 3, one obtains the explicit solution for the linear stationary rational expectations equilibrium in this simple case. 9
Corollary 1: When there are no endowment shocks and no private signals, there exists a unique stationary, linear, rational expectation price function:
and:
The empirical asset pricing literature has documented important sylized facts about the times-series of stock returns. Stocks whose return over the past twelve months is low relative to that of others tend to underperform, while stocks with recent strong returns tend to outperform. Hence, shorting the losers and investing the proceeds in recent winners generates high expected returns. This strategy has become known as the momentum strategy. It has been analyzed in depth by Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) . It has also been found that returns were predictable (see e.g. Cochrane, 1999) . These empirical findings have motivated theoretical analyses based on the assumptions that some investors are irrational (see, e.g., Hong and Stein, 1999) . Our framework offers an opportunity to check whether momentum and predictibility are consistent with equilibrium in a dynamic CAPM where all agents are rational. Recall the time t + 1 return is:
Consider the momentum strategy allocating to different assets weights proportional to their past return. The expected return on this momentum strategy is: E(R t R t+1 ). This is similar to the serial covariance in returns, emphasizing the link between positive serial return correlation and the profitability of momentum strategies. The following corollary spells out some of the properties of the times series of returns arising in the special case of our model where a dynamic CAPM obtains.
Corollary 2: Consider the special case of our model where there are no endowment shocks and no private signals. In the scalar case (where there is only one risky asset), the covariance between consecutive returns is positive. With N ex-ante identical risky assets, a sufficient condition for the momentum strategy to generate positive expected profits ( E(R t R t+1 ) > 0) and for returns to be positively correlated with prices ( Cov(R t+1 , P t ) > 0) is: ∃ρ f , ρ f =ρ f I and (1 + r)ρ f > 1.
In our dynamic CAPM, because cash flows f t are serially correlated, so are equilibrium returns. 10 Yet, while momentum and predictibility arise, pricing is rational and indexing is optimal. In this context, momentum and predictibility cannot be relied upon to outperform the passive strategy of holding the index. Neither does the observation that such phenomena arise empirically suffice to reject the CAPM.
Another interesting special case is when there is no private signal, but there are endowment shocks. Spiegel (1998) offers an insightful analysis of that case. For simplicity, assume ρ z = 0, i.e., z is just white noise. In that case, manipulating the system in Proposition 3 yields the following result:
Corollary 3: Consider the case where the proportion of agents with private signals ( λ) goes to 0, and endowment shocks are white noise. 11 If there exists a solution τ to:
then there exists a stationary, linear, rational expectation price function:
In this case the standard CAPM no longer holds. The relevant measure of aggregate risk is not the index, but the index augmented by the aggregate endowment shock. All agents have the same beliefs and they all share risk equally.
Corollary 3 states that equilibrium exists if there exists a solution τ to equation (3). This is a Ricatti equation, but the standard condition for existence of a solution does not hold (see ?????). In fact, there does not always exist a solution τ to the quadratic equation stated in the Corollary. This can be seen very clearly in the one risky asset case. In that case, equation (3) is a quadratic equation, and its discriminant is not always positive. Correspondingly, as shown by Spiegel (1998), when equilibrium exists, it is not unique. Multiplicity arises because of the circularity involved by the dynamic rational expectations loop: the price function depends upon the expectation of the price function. As in the standard dynamic-CAPM discussed above, since returns reflect cash flows (f t ) and since the latter are persistent, there is some persistence in returns, which can generate momentum. On the other hand, returns also include a transient component (z t ). This can give rise to mean reversion. Depending on parameter values, one effect or the other can dominate. Hence, momentum or reversals can arise in our dynamic rational expectations equilibrium.
10 Somewhat analogously, momentum also arises in the infinite horizon model developed in Lucas (1978) . Predictability in returns arises as an implication of the assumed persistence in cash flows and the stationary and monotone mapping in these types of models between cash flows and prices.
11 In that case, R a∈S z t a da is scaled up so that z t = λ R a∈S z t a da does not go to 0.
Numerical analysis
To illustrate the properties of the theoretical model and examplify how it can be used, we now offer a numerical analysis of the dynamic rational expectations equilibrium. For simplicity, as in Corollary 3 we assume ρ z = 0. In that case, the current endowment shock is independent from the previous one. Hence, z t−1 is no longer relevant for p t and thus D = 0. Consequently, the precision of the information of the informed agent and the uninformed agent simplify to:
respectively. To reduce the computational burden, we consider the case where there are only two assets (N = 2) and assume that their cash-flows and endowment have the same ex-ante distribution, while their cross-correlation is set to 0. In this case, the definition of the auxiliary function Φ simplifies to:
, where R = I + A + Bρ f and A, B, C and are two by two matrices, while G is a two by one vector. Also, to exploit the symmetry of the distributions of the two assets, we consider a symmetric equilibrium, where, in each matrix, the two diagonal terms are equal to each other, and the two off-diagonal terms also are equal to each other. Similarly, the two elements of G are the same. Hence, the equilibrium price function involves only seven parameters, which we concatenate in the parameter vector: θ.
where, for any matrix M , col [M] denotes the vector fomed with the first row of M , and G(1) is the first element of the vector G. Our numerical approach involves the function H, defined as follows:
where ·× denotes element-wise multiplication. The equilibrium parameter vector is such that H = 0.
To perform the numerical analysis we rely on a method known as perturbation analysis. In the case where λ = 0, equilibrium is relatively easy to compute, following Corollary 3. Denote by θ 0 the vector of equilibrium parameters in this relatively simple case:
Perturbation analysis takes the solution θ 0 as an intial benchmark and then proceeds to compute approximate solutions, for θ λ when λ > 0, relying on Taylor expansions.
where o( θ λ − θ 0 λ ) denotes the higher order terms, which are negligible when θ λ − θ 0 λ goes to 0. Noting that: H(θ λ , λ) = H(θ 0 , 0) = 0, and rearranging terms in equation (4) we obtain the approximate solution for the parameter vector:
Substituting this approximate solution into the function H, we obtain a measure of the approximation error:
e can be interpreted as the approximation error expressed as a percentage of the value of the parameter. Figure 2 plots the numerical approximation error as a function of λ. It shows that the approximation is very good until λ approaches 8% and then rises exponentially. Figure 3 plots the parameter estimates as a function of λ. For simplicity, we focus on the diagonal terms. Both A and C go down with λ, while B goes up with λ.
[To Be Completed]
Econometric approach
We now wish to assess the empirical and practical relevance of our theoretical analysis. Are the prices set in actual markets consistent with our partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium? What's the performance of the portfolio strategy suggested by our model?
Testable restriction implied by theory
To test the model we cannot take a similar approach to Hansen and Singleton (1982) . In their framework the aggregate investor is observable, since all information is public. They test whether this representative agent invests optimally. This is not feasible in our setting, where the econometrician does not observe the endowment shocks and the signals necessary to construct the representative investor.
On the other hand, the information set of the econometrician is similar to that of the uninformed agent in the model. 12 The uninformed agent's demand is the solution to a one-period mean-variance portfolio choice problem, where the information content of prices is used to estimate expected returns and variances. Our theoretical analysis implies that, in the partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, this price-contingent strategy fares better, in meanvariance terms, than indexing. In contrast, if the CAPM holds, then indexing is optimal. Hence, to test the partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium against the CAPM, we compare the performance of the price-contingent portfolio strategy of the uninformed agent to that of the index.
We focus upon what is likely to be the most robust implication of the theory, i.e., that prices contain information, rather than on more parametric aspects of the model. Our comparison of the performance of the price-contingent strategy to that of the index is in the line of empirical investigations of asset pricing models, testing the efficiency of a particular portfolio, such as a market proxy. However, our approach differs from previous empirical results on the inefficiency of market proxies.
• First, our theory implies that indexing should be inferior to a portfolio strategy constructed using public information available to the agent when he makes his investment decision. Hence our empirical analysis will be ex-ante, i.e., to form portfolios at date t, we will use only data observed prior to t. In contrast, Fama and French [1996] and Davis, Fama and French [2000] ) rely on ex-post information. They find that proxies of the market portfolio are mean-variance suboptimal relative to some ex-post determined combination of three specific factor portfolios: the market proxy itself, a portfolio long in small firms and short in large firms, and a portfolio long in value stock and short in growth stock. Cooper, Gutierrez and Marcum [2004] have recently shown that if one uses only information in prior returns to determine optimal combinations, the improvement from investing in Fama and French's factor portfolios is insignificant.
• Second, we compare indexing against a portfolio strategy based on specific information suggested by theory, namely, relative prices, as opposed to information obtained through an exhaustive search over all available information. Without the discipline that theory imposes, such an exercise runs into the danger of data snooping. Information in relative prices has never been explicitly conditioned on before. This information may have been implicitly conditioned on in other studies, such as those evaluating momentum investment. We discuss the difference between our (price-contingent) strategy and momentum investment in the next section.
Before we carry out the empirical analysis, several issues have to be addressed. Which asset universe should we consider and what period? What securities should we include in the construction of our price-contingent trading strategy? How should we measure relative prices? How should we measure performance? And how can we tell whether the superior information is statistically significant? We will address these issues in turn.
The Data
We focus on monthly returns on U.S. common stock listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, as recorded by CRSP. The span of our analysis is limited by CRSP, namely, 7/1927 till 12/2000. The null hypothesis is that the value-weighted CRSP index is optimal. This index has been used as the market proxy in previous empirical studies. Against the null hypothesis, we the test the hypothesis that the index is outperformed by the price-contingent portfolio. In principle, one can construct those portfolios by combining individual stocks. This requires, however, that one handle thousands of different stocks, correlating their returns to their prices, a computationally challenging exercise. A more parsimonious approach is to use groups of stocks as building blocks for our portfolios.
A natural choice for these groups of stocks is to focus on the six portfolios which have been used extensively in the empirical asset pricing literature. These are specific portfolios constructed from a double sort of the securities based on the size of the issuing firms as well as the ratio of book value to market value. Together, they make up the three Fama-French factor portfolios mentioned before. We will refer to them as the six FF benchmark portfolios. Monthly returns are taken from Ken French's web site. We use the returns that are adjusted for the substantial transaction costs caused by flows of individual assets in and out of the portfolios. Such flows are the result of changes in firm size, book and market values.
The choice of these assets for studying the information content of prices is suitable in light of the well-known dispersion in their relative prices over time, enhancing the potential power of our statistical analysis. However, the Fama and French portfolios do not significantly outperform indexing on an ex ante basis, as shown by Cooper, Gutierrez and Markum [2004] . Hence, the performance of price-contingent strategies using only ex ante information to form portfolios of these assets cannot be due to data mining. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics on the monthly returns of the six FF benchmark portfolios. Portfolio 1 selects stocks of large companies with low ratio of book to market value. Portfolio 2 also selects large companies, but with medium book to market value. Portfolio 3 is comprised of large value companies. Portfolios 4 to 6 are analogous to portfolios 1 to 3, but for small firms only. All portfolios are value-weighted. Details can be found on Ken French's website. Both the value and size effects are obvious from Table 1 : the mean monthly return increases with the book-to-market ratio, and decreases with size. Notice also that the returns exhibit substantial kurtosis.
It is not obvious how to measure the relative prices on which our portfolio allocation strategy will be based. We do not have the valuations of the six FF benchmark portfolios. We opted to use the weights in a buy-and-hold portfolio of the six FF benchmark portfolios, reinvesting dividends into the FF portfolio that generates them. More specifically, let R t i denote the rate of return on FF benchmark portfolio i (i = 1, ..., 6) over month t. (t = 1 corresponds to 7/1927). Let p t i denote our measure of the relative price of portfolio i at the beginning of month t. It is computed as follows:
t > 0. We arbitrarily set: p 0 i = 0.3, 0.25, 0.15, 0.13, 0.1, and 0.07, respectively, for i = 1, ..., 6. 13 Notice that 6 i=1 p t i = 1, so our prices are effectively portfolio weights in the indexing portfolio that starts out with $1 at the end of 6/1927, originally invested across the six FF benchmark portfolios as in the p 0 i s above, with dividends reinvested in the components that generated them. Our proxies for relative prices are thus weights in a value-weighted portfolio. Appendix II offers more detailed information on these weights and compares them to the weights in the CRSP index.
One could be concerned about persistence in the prices. Our portfolio allocation strategy will be based on projections of a month's returns onto the vector of prices at the beginning of the month. The properties of estimated projection coefficients are known to be unusual when the explanatory variables exhibit persistence. In particular, the significance of the projection coefficients may be spurious, and the out-performance of the resulting price-contingent strategy may be a statistical artifact. To be sure that this is not the case, it is imperative that we perform an ex-ante portfolio performance evaluation. As mentioned before, this is exactly what we do. If the significance of the projection coefficients is not spurious, persistence in the regressors (prices) is actually a virtue. Standard least squares projection coefficients are known to converge faster.
Portfolio Allocation Strategy
Like the portfolio strategy of the uninformed agent in our model, the allocation strategy we implement empirically is based on simple mean-variance optimization. For each month in the sample, referred to as the target month, we determine the composition of the portfolio that promises the highest conditional expected return for a volatility equal to that of the benchmark CRSP index. In accordance with our theory and extant empirical studies, short-sale constraints are not imposed.
Determining this portfolio requires estimating expectations and variances. We follow our theory and estimate conditional expected returns by projecting returns onto prices. Variances and covariances are estimated from the errors of these projections. To determine the optimal portfolio for any target month, we use observations from the sixty-month period prior to the target month. That is, our analysis is entirely ex-ante, i.e., only based on information that investors had available at the beginning of the target month. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) were used to estimate the coefficients in projections of returns onto prices, to adjust for the substantial autocorrelation in the error. It sufficed to adjust for first-order autocorrelation. No further adjustments were made, although one obviously could think of many potential improvements (Iterated Least Squares, higher-order autocorrelation in the error term, autoregressive heteroscedasticity, etc.). 14 As mentioned before, we pick the optimal price-contingent portfolio with the same volatility as the market portfolio. Volatilities are determined ex-ante. In the case of the price-contingent portfolio, this means that we use the covariance matrix of the GLS prediction errors to compute the ex-ante volatility. To obtain the ex-ante volatility for the market portfolio, we perform GLS projections of market returns onto the prices of the 6 FF benchmark portfolios over the 60 months prior to the target months, accounting for first-order autocorrelation in the error term. The ex-ante volatility of the market return over the target months is then obtained from the standard deviation of the prediction error of these GLS projections.
Accounting For Errors In Estimating Optimal Portfolio Weights
Because optimal weights for our price-contingent strategy are based on estimated expected returns, variances and covariances, we inevitably introduce estimation error. When we base ex-ante volatility estimates on the covariance matrix of the prediction errors from GLS projections of returns onto prices, we fail to properly account for estimation error. As a result, the ex-post volatilities may be higher. The ex-post volatilities can readily be estimated as mean squared differences between returns actually recorded over the target months and ex ante expected returns (from the GLS projections). In contrast, since no estimation of optimal portfolio weights is involved, the ex-ante volatility of the market indexing strategy is likely to be a good estimate of its ex-post volatility. Consequently, we suspected that the ex-post volatility of our pricecontingent strategy may be much higher than that of the market portfolio, even if volatilities matched ex-ante. The data confirm our suspicion.
To accommodate estimation error, one could directly adjust estimates of the ex-ante volatilities of the price-contingent strategy. The necessary adjustments are rather involved, and unfortunately, they require additional assumptions on the data generating process that reduce the robustness of the inference (e.g., the projection errors are jointly normal and independent over time). 15 Instead, we correct for estimation error by matching ex-post volatilities, as is often done in finance. 16 In particular, we determine the right combination of our price-contingent strategy with investment in the market portfolio that generates the same ex-post volatility as buying and holding the market. 17 With our return history, a 50-50 combination ensures a that variances are matched. As a result, in the performance evaluation to follow, we will compare the returns of two strategies: (i) a strategy that constantly re-invests 50% in our optimal price-contingent portfolio and 50% in the market portfolio; (ii) 100% market indexing (i.e., buying and holding the market portfolio). These two strategies generated approximately the same ex-post volatility over the period 7/1927 to 12/2000.
For brevity, we will refer in the sequel to the 50-50 combination of the optimal pricecontingent portfolio and the market as our price-contingent strategy. But bear in mind that it in fact mixes indexing with optimal price-contingent investing.
Performance Evaluation
After obtaining the optimal portfolio for each target month, we determine whether it outperforms the CRSP index. Note that our testing strategy is similar to the well-known Fama-MacBeth (1973) strategy to test the CAPM: both are two-step procedures, whereby information over the prior sixty months generates the input for the second step. 18 The second step is executed for each month ("target month") in the sample -starting obviously at month 61. 19 Testing is based on the time series of target months.
With mean-variance preferences, the Sharpe ratio (ratio of average excess return over volatility) is the appropriate performance measure to determine whether our price contingent portfolio outperforms the CRSP index. Because our price contingent portfolio is constrained to generate the same ex-post volatility as the CRSP index, the comparison of Sharpe ratios boils down to a comparison of mean returns. This facilitates statistical inference: a test of the significance of 15 For an in-depth analysis, see, e.g., Kandel and Stambaugh [1996] . 16 See, e.g., Cochrane [1999] , Figure 6 . 17 Cochrane [1999] compares the performance of indexing against that of alternative strategies by combining the latter with investment in Treasury bills. In contrast, we combine our price-contingent strategy with investment in the market portfolio.
18 In the first step, we use the returns observed during the previous sixty months to design the price contingent portfolio, while Fama-MacBeth use this data to estimate betas. In the second step we compare the performance of the price contingent portfolio to that of the index, while Fama and MacBeth regress returns onto betas. 19 We follow the tradition of using a sixty-month window. This is obviously arbitrary, but rudimentary experimentation with alternative window lengths (in particular, 12 and 120 months) produced inferior results.
the difference in Sharpe ratio is merely a test of differences in mean returns, i.e., a standard z−test.
We investigate subperiods of ten years, but our performance plots allow the reader to gauge the influence of any single month on the overall significance. That is, we report partial zstatistics, from which the influence of outliers can be gauged, and from which significance levels can be deduced for any subsample. 20 The partial z-statistics are computed as follows. Let R t C denote the return on the CRSP over month t. Let R t P denote the month-t return on our price-contingent portfolio. For a sample that starts at T 1 and ends at T 2 , the partial z-statistics are computed from the partial sums of the difference between the return on the price contingent portfolio and that on the index:
We estimate σ asσ
This is a (heteroscedasticity-consistent) estimate of the standard deviation of the return differences, under the null that the expected return differences equal zero. 21 The partial z-statistics form a stochastic process on [T 1 , T 2 ], so they are easy to visualize. The functional central limit theorem predicts that, in large samples (meaning T 2 − T 1 → ∞),
where W denotes a standard Brownian motion on [0, 1] . Note that the usual z-statistic over [T 1 , T 2 ] has t = T 2 and hence,
i.e., its asymptotic distribution is standard normal, in accordance with the central limit theorem. Confidence bands of 95% can readily be computed as:
We provide plots of the partial z-statistics for T 1 = 0 (before the start of our sampling period, i.e., 6/1927), and T 2 = T (the end of our sampling period, namely, 12/2000). That is, we report z 0,T,t . In that case, the 95% confidence intervals are given by:
One can compute confidence intervals starting at any T 1 > 0 and conditional on the partial z-statistic at that point, z 0,T,T 1 . These derive from the fact that 22
Hence, the confidence interval starting T 1 and conditional on z 0,T,T 1 equals
We plot such conditional confidence intervals at ten-year intervals.
Empirical Results
Main Results
The main results are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the difference in Sharpe ratio between the optimal price-contingent portfolio and the CRSP index. The Sharpe ratios are estimated as sixty-month moving averages centered around the target month. Volatilities are estimated as the mean squared difference between the recorded return and the return predicted by the GLS projections of returns onto prices. 23 The average difference in Sharpe ratios is 0.048. 24 Our price-contingent strategy thus adds substantially to the achievable return. Figure 4 demonstrates that, with the exception of a few subperiods, our price-contingent optimal strategy outperforms the CRSP index consistently since the beginning of the sampling period. Figure 5 displays the evolution of the corresponding partial z-statistic. It confirms that the outperformance was significant. Consider the evolution of the z-statistic from the beginning of the sample period (1927) to its end (2000) . The square-root function depicts the confidence bounds. The z-statistic crosses the confidence bound, indicating significant outperformance, as soon as the 1930's. The final value of the statistic, at the end of the sample, reaches a highly significant value between 2.5 and 3. The gradual increase in the z-statistic indicates that the outperformance of the price-contingent strategy is not the effect of a few outliers. Figure 3 also enables the reader to check the significance of the outperformance of the price-contingent strategy for any of the decades in our sample : 1932-1942, 1942-1952, ..., 1982-1992 . The zstatistic is positive at the end of the decade in all but one ten-year subperiod; the corresponding p-level is 0.06. 25 The performance is significant at the 5% level in 2 out of 7 ten-year subperiods;
22 The functional central limit theorem predicts that the asymptotic behavior of the partial z-statistic is that of the standard Brownian motion. This not only means that partial z-statistics are normally distributed (one could have derived that from a standard central limit theorem), but, more importantly, that increments are independent. It is precisely this independence that allows us to "re-start" the confidence intervals at any T1 > 0 as if a new, independent sample was produced.
23 To compute the volatility of our price-contingent strategy, we use the GLS predicted return for the market as estimate of the expected return. This is consistent with the null hypothesis that the price-contingent strategy does not outperform buying and holding the market portfolio. Results hardly change when the return prediction for the price-contingent strategy is also based on the GLS projections of the returns on the 6 FF benchmark portfolios onto their prices. E.g., the average difference in the monthly Sharpe ratios changes from 0.048 to 0.047. 24 The average return on our price-contingent strategy is 1.4% per month (18% on an annual basis); that of the market portfolio equals 1.2% (15% on an annual basis). The ex-post variance on both portfolios is 21% per year.
25 This p-level is based on a simple binomial test evaluating the probability of at least x positive outcomes (performance) in n independent trials (periods) when the probability of a positive outcome is 0.5. In the above, x = 6 and n = 7.
the corresponding p level is about 0.05. 26 That is, there is little doubt about the significance of the outperformance.
Thus we find that our price-contingent allocation strategy significantly outperforms the index. This is consistent with our Noisy Rational Expectations model, where prices reflect economically relevant information, while at the same time not fully revealing all of it.
Perspective
To build perspective, we now compare the performance of our price-contingent strategy to that of alternative strategies that have recently been suggested as enhancements of pure market indexing. These alternatives were inspired by a number of anomalies in the cross-section of average historical stock returns as well as their time series behavior, namely, size, value and momentum. The anomalies are summarized in, e.g., Cochrane [1999] . Further references include Cooper, Gutierrez and Marcum [2004] , David, Fama and French [2000] , Fama and French [1996] for the size and value anomalies, and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok [1996] and Lewellen [2002] for the momentum anomaly.
The size anomaly concerns the returns of small firms relative to those of large firms. It has led researchers to suggest adopting a zero-investment strategy that is long small firms and short large firms. The standard portfolio that implements this strategy is referred to as the Fama-French SMB ("small minus big") portfolio. 27 Analogously, the value anomaly concerns the returns of firms with high book value of equity relative to market value, against the returns of firms with low book-to-market ratio. It suggests following a strategy that is long in high-value firms and short in low-value firms. Fama and French have constructed a standard zero-investment portfolio that implements this strategy, namely, the HML portfolio ("high minus low").
The momentum anomaly concerns the persistently positive returns one obtains of a strategy that is long recent winners and short recent losers. Usually, a twelve-month window is considered. Portfolio weights are proportional to the difference between the return over the previous 12 months relative to the average performance.
There are various ways to exploit the size, value and momentum anomalies in order to enhance the performance of one's portfolio. One simple strategy is to combine the market portfolio with investments in either SMB, HML, or the momentum portfolios. Since SMB, HML and the momentum portfolio are all zero-investment portfolios, these combinations amount to adjustments to standard market portfolio weights. For instance, investing in the market plus SMB translates into over-weighing small firms and under-weighing large firms (relative to the market).
Of these strategies, the combination of the market portfolio and a momentum portfolio comes closest in spirit to our price-contingent strategy, because both exploit information in past returns. As shown in Section II, the momentum effect is perfectly consistent with our theoretical framework. It is, however, a secondary effect, which means that the momentum strategy should not out-perform our price-contingent strategy when evaluated in mean-variance space. 28 The relationship between our price-contingent strategy and size and value investing is less clear, because there is no role for firm size or book value of assets in our theoretical framework. To the extent that size and value are secondary effects, enhancement of indexing by skewing weights towards small firms or high book-to-market value ratios should not lead to out-performance relative to our price-contingent strategy.
We demonstrate that this is the case in Figure 6 . This figure plots the evolution of wealth when an investor had started on 6/30/1932 with one dollar and invested according to one of five possible strategies. The five strategies exhibited the same ex-post monthly return volatility over the period 7/1932-12/2000 , so the ordering in mean-variance space can be readily inferred from the relative wealth levels that the strategies generate. The five strategies are as follows.
1. Indexing: The investor buys and holds the CRSP value-weighted index (the market portfolio) throughout the 68 1/2-year period.
2. Indexing With Size Enhancement: The investor invests 95% in the market portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills, adding 0.2 units of the (zero-investment) Fama-French SMB portfolio for every dollar invested in the market, and re-balancing at the end of each month.
Indexing With Value Enhancement:
The investor invests 95% in the market portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills, adding 0.25 units of the (zero-investment) Fama-French HML portfolio for every dollar invested in the market, and re-balancing at the end of each month.
Indexing With Momentum Enhancement:
The investor invests 95% in the market portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills, adding 0.2 units of a momentum portfolio for every dollar invested in the market, and re-balancing at the end of each month. The (zero-investment) momentum portfolio invests in each of the 6 FF benchmark portfolios in proportion to the return they generated over the previous 12 months relative to the average return. The constant of proportionality is chosen so that the momentum portfolio generates the same ex-ante volatility as the market portfolio. 29
Price-Contingent Strategy:
The investor puts 50% of wealth in the market portfolio, and 50% in the optimal price-contingent strategy with the same ex-ante volatility as the market portfolio; the portfolio is re-balanced monthly.
The portfolio structures in strategies 2 to 4 are designed to ensure that the variance of the portfolio matches that of the index. Investing a fraction of the portfolio in Treasury bills was necessary to ensure this volatility matching. The SMB, HML and momentum portfolio have virtually zero correlation with the market (as also found by Cochrane, 1999) . Hence, simply adding these zero-investment portfolios to the market would have increased the volatility of the portfolio above that of the index. To offset this increase, 5% of the wealth is invested in Treasury bills. Treasury bill return data are from CRSP. Figure 6 confirms that there are effects from size, value and momentum, increasing in this order. That is, combining the market portfolio with the Fama-French SMB portfolio improves upon buying and holding the market portfolio; a combination with the Fama-French HML portfolio does even better; and a combination with the momentum portfolio does best.
Nevertheless, Figure 6 also demonstrates that the price-contingent strategy far outperforms the four alternatives. Our theory allows us to interpret the incremental wealth from our pricecontingent strategy as a measure of the value of the informational content of prices in the partially revealing rational expectation equilibrium.
The Nature Of The Return-Price Relationship
In principle, the return-price relationships that are at the heart of the success of our pricecontingent strategy can be rather counter-intuitive. For instance, as shown in Admati (1985, Section 4 , pages 641 to 646), it is possible that a higher price for a given asset implies a lower dividend (and a fortiori a lower rate of return). All depends on the correlation structure between the payoffs in the multi-asset economy. The pattern of correlations thus arising is much more complex and richer than the simple pattern of continuations upon which the momentum strategy relies.
To document this point we computed the partial correlation between a portfolio's return and its own price. Below is a list of the average slope coefficients in the GLS projections of the returns of the 6 FF benchmark portfolios onto prices. 30 We only report the slope coefficient corresponding to a portfolio's own price. Each sixty-month estimation period prior to a target month generates one estimate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed as the sample standard deviation of the estimated slope coefficients. We only report results from nonoverlapping sixty-month periods. 31 The FF benchmark portfolios are identified as holding stock in big firms (B), small firms (S), high-value (H), medium-value (M) or low-value firms (L). The (partial) correlation between a portfolio's return and its own price is generally negative. It is significantly negative for firms with extremely high or low book-to-market value ratios.
Conclusion
This paper studies the implications of information asymmetry for equilibrium asset pricing and portfolio choice. We extend Admati's (1985) multi-asset rational expectations model to the dynamic case. Prices are only partially revealing because the demand of informed investors reflects their random endowment shocks, along with their signals. Equilibrium prices are set as in a representative agent economy where the market portfolio would include the aggregate risky endowment shock and the beliefs of the representative agent would average those of the informed and the uninformed. This pricing relation cannot be directly tested since the beliefs of the representative agent are not observable by the econometrician. On the other hand, the information set of the econometrician is comparable to that of uninformed agents with no endowment shocks. We empirically construct the conditional mean-variance optimal portfolio of the uninformed agent. Consistent with our theory, we find that it outperforms the index both economically and statistically.
There is still ample scope for improving the performance of price-contingent strategies. Our results are based on rather crude groupings of stocks. Less aggregate groupings should be contemplated, as well as other groupings (e.g., industry-based portfolios). 32 Our estimation of the correlation between returns and prices is based on simple linear generalized least squares. We did not investigate more sophisticated specifications or estimation strategies, such as nonlinear least squares or conditional heteroskedasticity. No attempt was made to estimate the optimal window size on which to estimate the correlation between prices and returns. Refining the statistical analysis along those and other lines may yield more powerful information extraction and consequently superior performance.
The significant outperformance we uncover suggests that the price-contingent investment approach is a valuable complement to fundamental and quantitative investment analysis. It should be emphasized that our results are out of sample, so that the outperformance we obtain is based on information that was available to the investors at the time portfolio allocation decisions had to be made. Our results suggest that value can be created not only in traditional ways, by designing optimal portfolios (quantitative investment analysis) or estimating cash flows (fundamental investment analysis), but also by studying price formation in the marketplace and using the results to infer information about future returns that only competitors observe directly. Our setting provides a reconciliation between the philosophies of active and passive portfolio management as investors tilt their portfolios in favor of the assets for which they are particularly optimistic and in that sense follow active strategies.
Finally,
Hence, (1 + r)ρ f > 1 is a sufficient condition for momentum to arise. Keeping the simplifying assumption that all the assets are identical ex-ante and that ρ f = ρ f I, the covariance between returns and prices is:
After some manipulations, this simplifies to:
QED
Appendix II: Comparison between our proxies for relative prices and weights in the CRSP index While our proxies for relative prices are weights in a value-weighted portfolio, they differ from the weights in the CRSP value-weighted index. First, the initial weighting is relatively arbitrary and unrelated to the CRSP weights (but the choice does not affect our empirical results). Second, the CRSP weights are determined from the relative valuations of the component stock, and not as buy-and-hold weights whereby dividends are reinvested in the stock that generates them. CRSP effectively re-invests dividends in all stocks, proportional to the relative valuations of the stock. Third, the CRSP index is periodically extended through new issues, and it shrinks when firms go bankrupt, stock is repurchased, or merged into privately-held companies. These effects are adjusted for indirectly through similar adjustments in the FF benchmark portfolios -but such adjustments occur only on a quarterly basis. 33 Figure 4 : Evolution of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of: (i) a strategy with 50% in the CRSP value-weighted index (the market index) and 50% in the optimal price-contingent portfolio whereby the return-prices relationship is estimated from the sixty months prior to the target month [weights change as a function of (a) expected returns based on relative prices and the estimated price-return relationship and (b) corresponding prediction error variances; the ex-ante volatility of this portfolio is the same as that of the market index], and (ii) the market index, 7/1927-12/2000. The two strategies generate the same ex-post volatility. The difference in Sharpe ratios is estimated on the basis of a moving, fixed-length window of sixty months centered around the target month. Figure 5: Evolution of the partial z-statistic of the difference in return between: (i) a strategy with 50% in the CRSP value-weighted index (the market index) and 50% in the optimal pricecontingent portfolio whereby the return-prices relationship is estimated from the sixty months prior to the target month [weights change as a function of (a) expected returns based on relative prices and the estimated price-return relationship and (b) corresponding prediction error variances; the ex-ante volatility of this portfolio is the same as that of the market index], and (ii) the market index, 7/1927-12/2000. The two strategies generate the same ex-post volatility. Strategy (i) outperforms strategy (ii) when the partial z-statistic is positive; the performance is significantly different from zero in a given ten-year period if the partial z-statistic moves outside the 95% confidence region bounded by the square-root function anchored at the beginning of the ten-year period. (ii) Indexing with Size Enhancement (dash-dotted line; 95% investment in the market portfolio, plus 20% invested in the Fama-French SMB zero-investment portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills; the SMB portfolio is long small firms and short large firms); (iii) Indexing with Value Enhancement (dashed line; 95% investment in the market portfolio, plus 25% invested in the Fama-French HML zero-investment portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills; the HML portfolio is long firms with high bookto-market value ratio and short firms with low book-to-market value ratio); (iv) Indexing with Momentum Enhancement (dotted line; 95% investment in the market portfolio, plus 20% invested in the standard zero-investment momentum portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills; the momentum portfolio is long recent winners and short recent losers among the 6 FF benchmark portfolios; winners and losers are determined by the return over the previous 12 months relative to the average); (v) Our price-contingent strategy (heavy solid line; 50% in the market portfolio and 50% in an optimal price-contingent portfolio, as explained in the captions of Figures 4 and 5 ).
